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WHAT’S MINE IS MINE, BUT WHAT’S
YOURS SHOULD ALSO BE MINE: AN
ANALYSIS OF STATE STATUTES THAT
MANDATE THE IMPLANTATION OF
FROZEN PREEMBRYOS
Diane K. Yang*
INTRODUCTION
In recent years, the advancements in reproductive technology
have led to a surge in the number of couples seeking fertility
treatments such as in vitro fertilization (“IVF”).1 IVF is one of
many artificially assisted conception procedures available to
infertile couples.2 In a country where one in every five couples is
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individuals: Professor Jennifer Rosato for her invaluable insight, comments
and guidance; David Keusch for his helpful suggestions; her friends, Andrea
Anderson, Annie Lam, Debbie Lee, and Belinda Leung, who offered their
encouragement and support; the entire staff of the Journal of Law and Policy,
especially her editors, Caroline Nadal and Sonia Robertson; and her mother
for her unconditional love and extraordinary patience.
1
The IVF procedure accounted for approximately 74% of the Assisted
Reproductive Technologies (“ARTs”) used in 1999. Center for Disease
Control and Prevention, 1999 Assisted Reproductive Technology Success
Rates: National Summary and Fertility Clinic Reports, fig.2, available at
http://www.cdc.gov/nccdphp/drh/ART99/index99.htm (last visited Apr. 28,
2002).
2
Although a vast majority of the cases involve disputes between couples
who later separate, there have been instances where unmarried individuals
have also sought the use of IVF to conceive children. See discussion infra note
211 (discussing a criminal case where a bachelor hired a surrogate to undergo
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infertile, the United States has emerged as a leader in disputes
involving the custody of frozen preembryos3 created by artificial
conception procedures.4 Currently, however, there are no federal
statutes that provide a uniform consensus on resolving the
disputes over the ownership of preembryos. In an effort to create
predictability and eliminate confusion over future disposition of
preembryos, several states5 have enacted legislation requiring
specific treatment of preembryos in the event of death,
separation, divorce of the commissioning couple, or any other
unforeseen circumstances.6
The different views regarding the status of preembryos have
caused debate and unpredictability. The lack of direction from a
IVF with his sperm).
3
Courts and commentators addressing this topic identify the fertilized egg
at the developmental stage when cryopreservation takes place in different
ways. Some courts, for example, use the term “pre-zygote,” while others use
the term “preembryo.” See, e.g., J.B. v. M.B., 783 A.2d 707, 708 (N.J.
2001) (noting that the term “preembryo” rather than “embryo” should be used
when the ova are frozen); Kass v. Kass, 696 N.E.2d 174 (N.Y. 1998) (using
the term “pre-zygote”). Furthermore, the New Jersey court found that because
“[a] preembryo is a fertilized ovum up to approximately fourteen days old (the
point when it implants in the uterus),” it uses that term in place of “embryo”
because “preembryo is technically descriptive of the cells’ stage of
development when they are cryopreserved (frozen).” J.B., 783 A.2d at 708
n.1 (internal citation omitted). Since these terms are legally indistinguishable,
the terms “pre-zygote,” “preembryo” and “fertilized egg” will be used
interchangeably throughout this note.
4
See Daniel I. Steinberg, Note, Divergent Conceptions: Procreational
Rights and Disputes over the Fate of Frozen Embryos, 7 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J.
315, 317 (1997). Other leaders in custody disputes include Israel and the
United Kingdom. See, e.g., Helene S. Shapo, Frozen Pre-Embryos and the
Right to Change One’s Mind, 12 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 75, 76-7 (2002)
(finding that ART procedures are commonplace in these countries and briefly
discussing the significant custody cases that arose in each locale).
5
These states include Florida, Illinois, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana,
Missouri, New Hampshire, New Mexico, and Pennsylvania. See infra note
158 (describing the restrictions in each state).
6
David H. Fiestal, Note, A Solomonic Decision: What Will Be the Fate of
Frozen Preembryos?, 6 CARDOZO WOMEN’S L.J. 103, 107-08 (1999) (noting
that a few states have passed statutes to address the disposition of frozen
preembryos).

YANGMACRO4-29.DOC

7/16/02 2:33 PM

FROZEN PREEMBRYO STATUTES

589

majority of state legislatures forces socially vital issues such as
one’s procreative freedom and the status of a preembryo to be
decided and determined by judges who represent the opinions and
morals of a select few rather than society at large.7 Although it is
common in family law for judges to decide the legal direction and
standards of particular problems,8 it is best for legislators, who
represent the public, to decide the issues and impose uniformity
in the law. Furthermore, judges have been forced to sift through
an array of complicated factors pertaining to consent agreements,
contracts, and other legal matters with little statutory guidance,
creating a confusing and contradictory body of caselaw. With
more than 100,000 frozen preembryos stored in IVF clinics
throughout the country, a number growing at a rate of 18.8%
annually,9 legislative guidance is needed. Couples attempting IVF
are entitled to direction from the legislature prior to undergoing
the procedure. The legislatures should enact statutes that
thoroughly address the disposition of these preembryos in a way
that ensures maximum procreative freedom.
Although a few states have enacted specific statutes to deal
with the issue of frozen preembryos, each differs widely as to the
legal status of and rights attributed to these cells.10 Part I of this
note provides an introduction to the IVF procedure and describes
how frozen preembryos are created. Part II focuses on present
caselaw and how the state courts have dealt with the issue of
custody disputes. Part III describes and analyzes state legislative

7

See Barbara L. Shapiro, “Non-Traditional” Families in the Courts: The
New Extended Family, 11 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. LAW. 117, 118 (1993)
(noting that judges often voice their moral objections and fears of state
intrusions in familial decisions).
8
Id.
9
See Lori B. Andrews & Nanette Elster, Regulating Reproductive
Technologies, 21 J. LEGAL MED. 35, 59 (2000); see also Jackie Jadrnack,
Legal Chill Surrounds Frozen Embryos, ALBUQUERQUE J., Apr. 1, 2001,
available at 2001 WL 17938689 (stating that there are an estimated 100,000 to
200,000 frozen preembryos being stored in fertility clinics throughout the
country).
10
See discussion infra Part III (discussing and comparing the Florida,
Louisiana, and New Mexico statutes).

YANGMACRO4-29.DOC

590

7/16/02 2:33 PM

JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY

responses regarding the disposition of frozen preembryos and
analyzes the scope of protection state laws provide and more
importantly, the priorities of each law. It also argues that the
Florida statute, which requires couples to determine the
disposition of their preembryos in a signed agreement prior to
IVF,11 is the best approach to this sensitive issue because it
encourages participants to make conscious and thoughtful
decisions. Although some may argue that such agreements
defining familial relationships violate public policy, these
agreements should nevertheless be encouraged because they
ensure that parties will not be forced to accept outcomes they did
not anticipate.12 Finally, this note concludes that state statutes are
essential in providing guidance for the future of IVF programs,
and it proposes a revised version of Florida’s statute mandating
disposition agreements. Ultimately, this note predicts that as use
of IVF and other assisted reproductive procedures increase in
popularity, the potential for debate and controversy will also
intensify. Thus, the state legislatures should take a pro-active
position to determine the future of IVF programs, maximize
individual procreative rights, and establish predictability for
future IVF participants.
I. IN VITRO FERTILIZATION AND THE CREATION OF EXCESS
PREEMBRYOS
In the United States, approximately 6.1 million people,13 or
about 10% of the population that is of reproductive age, are

11

FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.17 (West 2001) (requiring the commissioning
couple and the treating physician to enter into a written agreement that
provides for the disposition of the cells).
12
See supra note 7 (noting that since judges voice their objections to state
intrusions, this creates ambiguity as to what the court might do if a custody
case over preembryos should come before the court).
13
American Society for Reproductive Medicine, ASRM: Frequently
Asked
Questions
About
Infertility,
available
at
http://www.asrm.org/Patients/faqs.html (last visited Apr. 28, 2002)
[hereinafter ASRM: Frequently Asked Questions].
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affected by infertility.14 Since 1978, when the first child
conceived by IVF was born,15 the use of artificial reproductive
technologies (“ARTs”) has grown into a largely unregulated,
billion-dollar industry.16 More than 45,000 American babies have
been conceived through IVF since its introduction in the United
States.17
IVF begins with administering fertility drugs to the woman to
stimulate egg production.18 The eggs are extracted from her
ovaries and placed in a petri dish to be combined with sperm to
fertilize the egg.19 Once fertilization has taken place, the cell
begins to divide.20 After the preembryo reaches the four-to-eight
cell stage, it is transferred into the woman’s uterus.21 Following
the development of cryopreservation22 in 1981,23 physicians have
been able to obtain more eggs with one extraction procedure and
can now create and store extra preembryos.24 Because only about
one in every four preembryos implanted results in a successful
pregnancy,25 the unavoidable result of IVF is the creation of extra
14

Infertility is defined as “the failure of a couple to conceive after one
year of intercourse without using contraception.” Id.
15
Thomas D. Arado, Note, Frozen Embryos and Divorce: Technological
Marvel Meets the Human Condition, 21 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 241, 241 (2001).
16
LORI B. ANDREWS, THE CLONE AGE 48 (1999).
17
ASRM: Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 13.
18
See Machelle M. Seibel, A New Era in Reproductive Technology In
Vitro Fertilization, Gamete Intrafallopian Transfer and Donated Gametes and
Embryos, 318 NEW ENG. J. MED. 828, 829 (1988).
19
See id.
20
See id.
21
See id.
22
Cryopreservation is the freezing of preembryos in liquid nitrogen at
either the two-, four- or eight-cell stage of development. Arado, supra note
15, at 244 (citing Marcia J. Wurmbrand, Note, Frozen Embryos: Moral,
Social, and Legal Implications, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 1079, 1083 (1986)).
23
Andrea M. Siegel, Comment, Legal Resolution to the Frozen Embryo
Dilemma, 4 J. PHARMACY & L. 43, 46 (1995).
24
Id.
25
Center for Disease Control and Prevention, 1999 Assisted
Reproductive Technology Success Rates: National Summary and Fertility
Clinic Reports, Introduction to the 1999 National Report, available at
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preembryos. These surpluses are cryopreserved to ensure that
there are enough preembryos for use in future implantation.26
Since human eggs cannot be frozen independently and still
remain viable,27 many cryopreserved cells exist as either frozen
preembryos or as sperm. While eggs can only be frozen for a
short time,28 preembryos and sperm can be stored indefinitely.29
There are primarily three different views attributed to
preembryos and these various beliefs fuel the controversies over
frozen cells. One group believes that preembryos constitute life;
others believe that preembryos are the property of the people
who supplied the gametes; and another group would give them a
special interim status. Some argue that the party who wishes to
use the preembryos should be given sole control of the cells,30
and others think that the party who wishes to avoid procreation
should prevail.31
http://apps.nccd.cdc.gov/ART99/nation99.asp (last visited Apr. 28, 2002).
26
The average number of embryos transferred into a uterus before
pregnancy is 3.1 embryos per procedure with only about 21.7% of such
pregnancies resulting in live births. See id.
27
See Katheleen R. Guzman, Property, Progeny, Body Part: Assisted
Reproduction and the Transfer of Wealth, 31 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 193, 219
(1997). Scientists currently believe that oocyte freezing and thawing, the
process where the cells are cryopreserved and later defrosted in preparation
for an IVF procedure, are the most difficult feats of reproductive technology
to complete successfully because of the delicacy of the egg’s chromosomes.
Unlike sperm, the egg’s chromosomes are less resilient and unlikely to replace
the procedure of embryo freezing. Id. at 219 n.93.
28
Id.
29
Id.
30
See, e.g., Jill Melchoir, Comment, Cryogenically Preserved Embryos
in Dispositional Disputes and the Supreme Court: Breaking Impossible Ties,
68 U. CIN. L. REV. 921, 924 (2000) (arguing that the intentional creation of
embryos strongly implies a contract to procreate); Alise R. Panitch, Note, The
Davis Dilemma: How to Prevent Battles over Frozen Preembryos, 41 CASE W.
RES. L. REV. 543, 545 (1991) (arguing that the law should respect the special
status of preembryos and that the appropriate outcome should always be in
favor of the spouse who decides to implant).
31
See, e.g., Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 604 (Tenn. 1992) (finding
that “the party wishing to avoid procreation should prevail, assuming that the
other party has a reasonable possibility of achieving parenthood by means
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A. The “Preembryo as Person” Viewpoint
Those who view preembryos as persons argue that “a
person’s unique genetic makeup is complete as soon as that
person is conceived”; and, therefore, they object to the
intentional destruction of fertilized eggs.32 They adopt a “parens
patriae” viewpoint using the “best interest of the child” inquiry.33
Louisiana and New Mexico, adopting this view, have enacted
perhaps the most restrictive and controversial statutes. Both states
mandate the implantation of excess preembryos by either the
gamete providers or by a surrogate couple.34 Louisiana’s statute
other than use of the preembryos in question”); Michelle F. Sublett, Note,
Frozen Embryos: What Are They and How Should the Law Treat Them, 38
CLEV. ST. L. REV. 585, 616 (1990) (arguing that should a dispute between the
gamete providers occur, there should be a presumption in favor of letting the
preembryo expire over a gamete provider’s wish to bring the embryo to life
since no human life has developed).
32
Carl H. Coleman, Procreative Liberty and Contemporaneous Choice:
An Inalienable Rights Approach to Frozen Embryo Disputes, 84 MINN. L.
REV. 55, 66 (1999). See, e.g., Davis v. Davis, No. E-14496, 1989 WL
140495, at *9 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 21, 1989) (holding that human life begins
at conception rather than at implantation).
33
Parens patriae is “[a] doctrine by which a government has standing to
prosecute a lawsuit on behalf of a citizen, esp[ecially] on behalf of someone
who is under a legal disability to prosecute the suit.” BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY 1137 (7th ed. 1999).
34
See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:129 (West 2001) (finding that a
human preembryo is a juridical person and shall not be intentionally destroyed
by anyone including its gamete providers and fertility clinic that generated its
existence); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-9A-[1][g] (Michie 2001) (defining a
“fetus” as the product of conception until birth), [3][a] (stating that a fetus
cannot be subject to any activity that places it at risk unless the activity is for
the health needs of that particular fetus and the fetus is minimally placed at
such risk).
Although the New Mexico statute is similar to that of Louisiana because it
also requires the implantation of preembryos, New Mexico has not gone as far
as to define them as persons with separate individual rights. The problem with
both states’ implantation requirement is that they deprive the procreative rights
of IVF participants without a sufficient state interest. See Kramer v. Union
Free Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 627 (1969) (holding that limiting fundamental rights
can only be justified by a compelling state interest).
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regarding IVF and the status of preembryos is the most
comprehensive, but it is also the most questionable as to whether
it will pass constitutional scrutiny.35 Currently, Louisiana is the
only state that defines a preembryo as a “juridical person,”36 and
as a separate legal entity37 that can “sue or be sued.”38 Under this
statute, the preembryo is not the property of its progenitors, IVF
physicians, or clinical facilities that generates or maintains its
existence.39 Instead, if the donors of the sperm and egg renounce
their parental rights to the preembryo for in-utero implantation,
the preembryo must be made available for adoption.40
There is academic support for the view that a preembryo
should be given the rights of a person because, under this view,
the preembryo is a human life.41 Supporters of this belief would
give a preembryo all the rights and privileges of a human being
from the moment of conception.42 They believe that a preembryo
should be considered a life because it is a grouping of living

Second, the requirement of implantation prioritizes legislative intent over
medical concerns as to the best interest of the patients since the statutes do not
provide for medical exceptions when a physician would ordinarily refrain from
implanting more embryos than necessary because of the patient’s own physical
condition. See generally N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-9A-[1]-[7] (Michie 2001).
See also KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 311.715 (Banks-Baldwin 2001) (stating that
publicly funded IVF programs cannot conduct procedures that would
intentionally destroy the embryo).
35
See generally LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:124–130.
36
See, e.g., § 9:123.
37
See, e.g., § 9:125.
38
See, e.g., § 9:124.
39
See, e.g., § 9:126.
40
See id.
41
Symposium, Pushing the Boundaries: An Interdisciplinary Examination
of the New Reproductive Technology, 45 LOY. L. REV. 239, 240-41 (1999)
(noting that the fertilized cell is a “germinated genetic embodiment of a novel
human life. The newly united cell, or zygote, is a fertilized human ovum and
has the potential to develop into a human person.”).
42
John A. Robertson, Embryos, Families, and Procreative Liberty: The
Legal Structure of the New Reproduction, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 942, 971
(1986).
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cells, forming the basic units of human life.43 They further argue
that a preembryo has the same rights of a living being because its
conception resulted from an intentional act to reproduce.44 In
addition, they claim that scientific evidence supports this view,45
that if allowed to develop, a preembryo may become a human
life.46
This argument, however, is extreme. Preembryos and
embryos are lost naturally each day.47 Such occurrences are not
contemplated as a loss of life, but rather a loss of genetic cells.48
Many opponents argue further that the loss of cells “should not
change merely because the loss occurs through the IVF
process.”49 They contend that certain legalized birth control
methods, such as “morning after” pills50 and intrauterine devices
(“IUDs”),51 essentially cause the same loss of embryos by

43

David G. Dickman, Comment, Social Values in a Brave New World:
Toward a Public Policy Regarding Embryo Status and In-Vitro Fertilization,
29 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 817, 830 (1985).
44
Id.
45
Id.
46
Id.
47
Kim Schaefer, Comment, In Vitro Fertilization, Frozen Embryos and
the Right to Privacy—Are Mandatory Donation Laws Constitutional?, 22 PAC.
L.J. 87, 95 (1990). Seven days after fertilization, the preembryo is implanted
in the uterus; this is the stage where many preembryos are lost. See R. Alta
Charo, The Hunting of the Snark: The Moral Status of Embryos, Right-toLifers, and Third World Women, 6 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 11, 15 (1995) (“A
successful pregnancy depends on establishing a strong interaction between the
[pre]embryos and the tissues of the womb.”).
48
Id.
49
Id.
50
These pills, which require a prescription, prevent pregnancies by
stopping ovulation, fertilization, or implantation of a fertilized egg in the
uterus. See Jim Ritter, Having Pill Around Could Reduce Pregnancies
Morning-After Drug Should Be Prescribed in Advance, Group Says, CHIC.
SUN-TIMES, May 1, 2001, available at 2001 WL 7229028.
51
Scientists are still unclear as to how IUDs work to prevent pregnancy,
but some believe that they produce macrophages, white blood cells that
destroy sperm. See Contraception: Medical School to Test New IUD
Contraceptive, DRUG WEEK, Jan. 19, 2001, available at 2001 WL 17573310.

YANGMACRO4-29.DOC

596

7/16/02 2:33 PM

JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY

preventing its attachment to the uterine wall.52 While there are
other legalized methods to destroy preembryos, it follows that
preembryos created through IVF are no different and thus, are
not and should not be afforded similar legal protections as a
human life.
B. Frozen Preembryos Invoke a “Special Interim Status”
Many people agree that preembryos exist in an uncertain legal
status. They are cells that do not enjoy protection as “persons”
under federal law,53 but cannot be considered property because of
their potential to become life. As a result of this potential, many
scholars view preembryos as deserving a special status.54 To
these scholars any other legal treatment or categorization—such
as deeming them as “property”—would offend morals and
ethics.55 Some courts have also accepted this viewpoint. In Davis
v. Davis,56 for example, the Tennessee Supreme Court held that
preembryos were neither property nor life, but rather occupied a
“special interim status.”57

52

Schaefer, supra note 47, at 95.
See also Jennifer M. Dehmel, Note, To Have or Not to Have: Whose
Procreative Rights Prevail in Disputes over Dispositions of Frozen Embryos?,
27 CONN. L. REV. 1377, 1383 (1995) (“In Roe v. Wade, the United States
Supreme Court interpreted the word ‘person’ as used in the Fourteenth
Amendment to exclude the unborn. Although ‘person’ is not defined in the
Constitution, the Court held that ‘use of the word is such that it has application
only postnatally.’”).
54
See Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 588 (Tenn. 1992)
(acknowledging that even the American Fertility Society, an organization of
over 10,000 physicians and specialists working with problems of infertility,
has categorized embryos as occupying an interim status group). See also
Jennifer L. Carlow, Note, Davis v. Davis: An Inconsistent Exception to an
Otherwise Sound Rule Advancing Freedom and Reproductive Technology, 43
DEPAUL L. REV. 523, 526 (1994).
55
See John A. Robertson, In the Beginning: The Legal Status of Early
Embryos, 76 VA. L. REV. 437, 447 (1990).
56
842 S.W.2d at 594-98; see also infra Part II.A (discussing the specific
facts and holding of the case).
57
842 S.W.2d at 597 (“We conclude that preembryos are not, strictly
53
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Professor John Robertson supports the view of providing
special status for preembryos and advocates the use of contract
theory to resolve custody disputes.58 As a leading defender of the
use of contracts, he argues that they provide the only way to
adequately protect a couple’s interest in procreative autonomy.59
He claims that enforceable contracts will minimize potential
disputes and create more efficient IVF programs because of their
ability to establish certainty and predictability as to the
disposition of preembryos.60 Professor Robertson recognizes that
these agreements give both parties the opportunity to decide and
determine their reproductive future.61 By equating advance
agreements with living wills62 and donor cards,63 he concludes
that such directives are permissible.64 Moreover, he argues that
they protect “one’s current interests and autonomy . . . [by]
speaking, either ‘persons’ or ‘property,’ but occupy an interim category that
entitles them to special respect because of their potential for human life.”).
58
Professor of Law, University of Texas at Austin. Faculty Profiles,
University of Texas, School of Law, available at http://www.utexas.edu/
law/faculty/jrobertson (last visited Apr. 28, 2002). Professor Robertson has
written numerous articles and books on bioethical issues and is currently Chair
of the Ethics Committee of the American Society for Reproductive Medicine.
Id.
59
John A. Robertson, Prior Agreements for Disposition of Frozen
Embryos, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 407, 414 (1990). Furthermore, Robertson states
that “[c]lear rules for disposition of embryos is [sic] necessary to meet the
needs of infertile couples, to minimize disputes, and to facilitate efficient IVF
program operation.” Id. at 409.
60
Id.
61
Id.
62
Id. at 415 n.29. A living will is defined as follows:
An instrument, signed with the formalities necessary for a will, by
which a person states the intention to refuse medical treatment and to
release healthcare providers from all liability if the person becomes
both terminally ill and unable to communicate such a refusal.
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 945-46 (7th ed. 1999).
63
Robertson, supra note 59, at 415 n.28. He also argues that the use of
prior agreements for preembryos is similar to the use of living wills and donor
cards in that one’s current interests and autonomy may be served by the ability
to direct future events when the person is no longer able to decide. Id.
64
Id. at 415.
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direct[ing] future events when the person is unable or unavailable
to decide.”65
The recognition and enforcement of these contracts
maximizes procreative liberty because the outcome is based on
the mutual consent and control of both parents.66 Without such
authority, procreative rights are infringed because the “decisions
about [the pre]embryos will be made by others in ways that might
insufficiently value the reproductive concerns of the persons
involved.”67 If the prior agreement is not binding, the IVF
program, the court, or the legislature will determine the
disposition of the frozen preembryos.68 This may result in a
disposition contrary to the parents’ intent and thus, interfere with
procreative interests.69 In his view, couples will only be able to
rely on such agreements for the future disposition of their
preembryos with universal acceptance of such agreements.
Professor Carl Coleman is perhaps one of the strongest
opponents to the idea of creating contractual obligations to
determine the disposition of frozen preembryos.70 He expressly
rejects the constitutionality of such agreements,71 arguing that
contracts violate inalienable rights inherent to all individuals,
such as the right to procreate freely.72 He claims that an
agreement restricts a couple’s choice because the terms of the
contract, although once agreed upon, may no longer reflect the
65

Id. at n.28.
Id.
67
Id. at 415.
68
Id. at n.28.
69
Id. at 415.
70
Professor Coleman was formerly the Executive Director of the New
York State Task Force on Life and the Law, a nationally recognized
interdisciplinary commission. He has served on numerous governmental and
bar association committees. He currently chairs the Special Committee on
Treatment Decisions of the New York State Bar Association’s Health Law
Section and is an Associate Director of the Health Law and Policy Program at
Seton Hall. Biography, Seton Hall Law On-Line, available at
http://law.shu.edu/faculty/fulltime_faculty/colemaca/coleman.htm (last visited
Apr. 28, 2002).
71
Coleman, supra note 32, at 56, 88-90.
72
Id. at 57.
66
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couple’s present intent or desire.73 He further argues that the
decision to procreate or avoid procreation is such a significant
fundamental right that only upon the mutual consent of both
parties should a preembryo be either carried to term or
destroyed.74
C. Frozen Preembryos as Property Viewpoint
Those who consider preembryos as matrimonial assets or
“property,” equate preembryos as the personal property of their
gamete providers.75 Under this reasoning, preembryos can be
treated just as any other asset and thereby can be owned,
destroyed, gifted, or donated.76 Supporters of this viewpoint
place the desires and interests of the gamete providers above that
of the preembryo.77 Although this idea has existed for quite some
time, many jurisdictions have been hesitant to define preembryos
as property. 78
One of the most popular theories that supports the view of
preembryos as property is the “sweat equity” rule.79 The idea is

73

Id. at 126.
Id. at 82.
75
Guzman, supra note 27, at 207.
76
Id.
77
Id.
78
See, e.g., Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 596 (Tenn. 1992) (refusing
to define the status of preembryos as anything more than interim); but see
York v. Jones, 717 F. Supp. 421 (E.D.Va. 1989) (holding that preembryos
are the property of their gamete providers for purposes of a cryopreservation
agreement).
79
Paula Walter, His, Hers, or Theirs—Custody, Control and Contracts:
Allocating Decisional Authority over Frozen Embryos, 29 SETON HALL L.
REV. 937, 962 (1999). This approach favors women by resting on the
assumption that procreative rights, by their very biological nature, cannot be
equal between both genders. See generally Lori B. Andrews, The Legal Status
of Embryos, 32 LOY. L. REV. 357, 406 (1986); Judith Daar, Panel on
Disputes Concerning Frozen Embryos, 8 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 285, 293
(1999); John A. Robertson, Resolving Disputes over Frozen Embryos, 19
HASTINGS CTR. REP. 7 (1989); Tanya Feliciano, Note, Davis v. Davis: What
About Future Disputes?, 26 CONN. L. REV. 305, 348 (1993).
74
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that a woman should have sole decision-making authority with
respect to the fate of her preembryos.80 In numerous articles and
publications, scholars have recognized the argument that a
woman retains this decision-making right.81 By extending the
holding of Roe v. Wade,82 these scholars argue that since a
woman has the right to choose if and when to abort a pregnancy,
she should have the same freedom to control her frozen
preembryos.83 Applying this reasoning, a frozen preembryo
artificially sustained in liquid nitrogen is no different from a fetus
in the womb; therefore, the woman should retain the right to
determine its fate.84 Regardless of whether the father wishes to
procreate or avoid procreation, the woman retains ultimate
decision-making authority.85 Although this theory has
supporters,86 the reasoning is questionable and is subject to
criticism.
There are several flaws with the “sweat equity” argument.
First, although Roe v. Wade recognized the negative impact upon
a woman if she were forced to choose between carrying an

80

See Andrews, supra note 79, at 406. Those who favor this idea claim
that during IVF, women endure a physically and emotionally invasive
procedure, while men merely surrender sperm, a relatively simple and easy
task. Id. Since women undergo a more painful and difficult procedure, they
should be granted with the decision-making rights. Id.
81
See generally supra note 79 (noting the various scholars who have
written about a woman’s right to make the decision regarding the disposition
of her preembryos). See also Marcia J. Wurmbrand, Note, Frozen Embryos:
Moral, Social, and Legal Implications, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 1079, 1095-96
(1986) (noting that there are scholars who believe that a woman’s interest in
privacy, bodily autonomy, and limiting lineal descendants would entitle her to
dispose of her preembryos as she deems fit).
82
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (holding that the expansion of
privacy rights would cover the right of a woman to have an abortion).
83
Andrews, supra note 79, at 406.
84
Proponents of the “sweat equity” rule support a woman’s right to
decide the fate of preembryos because it is through her that preembryos are
formed. Thus, it is assumed that supporters would also view frozen
preembryos as no different from fetuses. See id.
85
Id.
86
Id.
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unwanted pregnancy or entering into motherhood,87 its holding
legalizing abortion was based on the fundamental right of
privacy.88 Frozen preembryos, stored in a clinic are significantly
different from a fetus sustained within the womb; thus, the
principles behind Roe are not triggered.89 Unlike in Roe, there is
no privacy interest because there is no burden or interference
with the woman’s body or personal autonomy.90 Moreover, the
legal status of a preembryo differs greatly depending on whether
it is in the womb or in a frozen state.91 While there are criminal
statutes to protect fetuses in the womb from intentional abortions
by a third party,92 it is not a criminal offense to accidentally or
intentionally destroy a preembryo outside of the uterus.93 A

87

Roe, 410 U.S. at 153.
Id. at 154 (stating that “the right of personal privacy includes the
abortion decision, but . . . this right is not unqualified and must be considered
against important state interests in regulation”).
89
Id. at 153. In Roe, the Court recognized various psychological, mental,
and physical burdens on a woman if the state forced her into unwanted
motherhood. Id. All of these factors pertain to a woman’s bodily autonomy.
Thus, frozen preembryos would not violate the privacy principles defined in
Roe since these cells are removed from the woman’s body.
90
See Radhika Rao, Constitutional Misconceptions, 93 MICH. L. REV.
1473, 1479 (1995).
91
Melchoir, supra note 30, at 950 (noting that a frozen preembryo exists
outside of the womb and since the bodily integrity of the woman is not
violated, state laws can prohibit its destruction where it otherwise could not if
the preembryo was attached to a uterine wall).
92
See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 782.09 (West 2001) (stating that “[t]he
willful killing of an unborn quick child, by any injury to the mother of such
child which would be murder if it resulted in the death of such mother”); ILL.
COMP. STAT. 720 ILCS 5/9-1.2(3)(b) (West 2001) (providing that it is a crime
to kill any individual of the human species from fertilization until birth other
than by a lawful abortion); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:32.5 (West 2001)
(providing that feticide is the killing of an unborn child); N.M. STAT. ANN. §
30-5-3 (Michie 2001) (providing that a criminal abortion is any act, not
justified as a medical termination, that ends a woman’s pregnancy); N.Y.
PENAL LAW § 125.00 (Consol. 2001) (defining homicide as any conduct that
causes the death of a person or an unborn child who is more than twenty-four
weeks from the moment of conception).
93
Currently, there are no statutes that impose criminal sanctions on a
88
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couple, therefore, can sue for monetary damages for the
destruction of their preembryos,94 but a physician who destroys a
preembryo could not be charged with murder.
Another flaw in the “sweat equity” theory is that under it
men and women are not afforded equal rights. Even though Roe
gives women the right to control the procreative process with
respect to traditional pregnancies, the decision does not vest
greater rights to women than men.95 Instead, “Roe and its
progeny are cited for the principle that the right to procreate and
the right not to procreate are independent rights, each equally
protected in the interest of either gender.”96 Because the statuses
of fetuses and preembryos are not equivalent under the law, the
interest in the fate of the preembryo is the same among both
gamete providers, man and woman. Neither party, therefore,
should gain sole control over the preembryos on the basis of sex
alone, as supporters of the “sweat equity” theory would argue.
Just from these few viewpoints, it is evident that the status of the
preembryo remains unclear.
II. BACKGROUND OF CASELAW
Cases with unforeseen circumstances, where the interested
person who destroys an embryo. Although there are criminal sanctions for
intentional feticide, many of these jurisdictions define a fetus, for the purposes
of imposing criminal charges, as those beings that have reached a specific
point of development. See supra note 92.
94
See, e.g., Del Zio v. Presbyterian Hosp., 1978 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
14450, at **3-6 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 14, 1978). In this case, the couple’s
physician, believing that Mrs. Del Zio could not reproduce naturally,
suggested that the couple attempt conception by IVF, a relatively new and
experimental treatment at the time. Id. at **2-3. The chairman of obstetrics
and gynecology, however, learned of the experimental procedure within his
department and ordered the culture destroyed. Id. at *3. The plaintiffs filed
suit for both conversion and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Id. at
*4. The jury awarded the plaintiffs $50,000 in damages for the second claim
only. Id. at *11.
95
Walter, supra note 79, at 962; see also Andrews, supra note 79, at
407.
96
Walter, supra note 79, at 962.
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parties have not made any agreements as to the disposition of
their preembryos, such as when death or divorce occurs, have
become increasingly problematic. Although there have been
precedent-setting cases involving disputes over the disposition of
these preembryos in states such as Tennessee,97 New York98 and
New Jersey,99 state legislatures should provide the courts with
greater guidance in this area.100 Today judges rather than the
gamete providers are deciding matters pertaining to procreational
rights.
A. Davis v. Davis: Supreme Court of Tennessee, 1992
Davis v. Davis was the first major case decided by a state’s
highest court with regard to the custody of preembryos.101 In
Davis, the Tennessee Supreme Court agreed with the appellate
court that there is a constitutional right to avoid procreation when
no pregnancy has taken place.102 The Davises could not procreate
naturally and attempted six IVF procedures, none of which led to

97

See, e.g., Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992) (holding that
there is an equal right to both procreate and avoid procreation and that the
interests of each party must be weighed).
98
See, e.g., Kass v. Kass, 696 N.E.2d 174 (N.Y. 1998) (upholding the
validity of predisposition agreements upon the divorce of the progenitors).
99
See, e.g., J.B. v. M.B., 783 A.2d 707 (N.J. 2001) (holding that even if
the husband and wife in this case had entered into an unambiguous agreement
regarding the disposition of their frozen preembryos, because it is against
public policy, the court will not enforce an agreement that would compel one
donor to become a parent against his or her will).
100
See infra Part III (discussing the different legislation regulating IVF).
101
Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 589.
102
Id. at 589, 590, 601. The Tennessee Supreme Court stated that it
granted review of the case not because it disagreed with the basic legal
analysis utilized by the intermediate court, but because the issue was of great
importance. Id. at 590. The court went on to hold that there is a fundamental
right to privacy so that “no other person or entity has an interest sufficient to
permit interference with the gamete-providers’ decision to continue or
terminate the IVF process, because no one else bears the consequences of
these decisions in the way that the gamete-providers do.” Id. at 602.
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a pregnancy.103 As a result, seven extra frozen preembryos were
created.104 When the Davis marriage dissolved, the couple could
not agree on the disposition of the preembryos.105 The parties had
not executed a prior written agreement to govern the disposition
of the preembryos in the event of divorce.106 While Mary Sue
Davis wanted to either retain the preembryos for her own use or
donate them to a childless couple, Junior Davis vehemently
opposed fathering a child and having it raised by others.107
Concluding that the preembryos were “human beings,”108 the trial
court gave custody to Mary Sue for the purpose of carrying them
to term through implantation.109 The appellate court reversed the
decision, finding that the husband’s interest in avoiding
procreation was constitutionally protected and that there was no
compelling state interest to justify the transfer against the will of
Junior Davis.110 Although the Tennessee Supreme Court agreed
with the intermediate court’s decision of avoiding forced
procreation, it disagreed with its legal analysis and created a new
legal framework to provide guidance in this area.111
The Tennessee Supreme Court refused to define a preembryo
103

Id. at 591.
Id. at 589.
105
Id.
106
Id. at 590.
107
Initially, Mary Sue Davis wanted the preembryos for another IVF
procedure to become pregnant. Id. at 589-90. However, at the time the case
was before the Tennessee Supreme Court, she had remarried and wanted the
authority to donate the preembryos to a childless couple. Id.
108
Id. at 589 (stating that the trial court defined the preembryos as human
beings “from the moment of fertilization”).
109
Id.
110
Davis v. Davis, No. E-14496, 1990 WL 130807, at *3 (Tenn. Ct.
App. Sept. 13, 1990) (stating that “[i]t would be . . . repugnant to order [the
husband] to bear the psychological, if not the legal, consequences of paternity
against his will”).
111
Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 590 (stating that review was granted because of
the importance of the case in developing new law regarding reproductive
technologies, and because the decision of the intermediate court “[did] not
give adequate guidance to the trial court in the event the parties cannot
agree”).
104
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as either property under the sole control and disposition of its
progenitors,112 or as a person who is afforded separate legal
interests.113 Instead, the court decided that a preembryo occupied
an interim level status in which it is entitled to special respect due
to its potential for life.114 Holding that preembryos lacked the
same legal protections afforded to fetuses,115 the court found that,
as a matter of law, progenitors should have primary decisionmaking authority regarding their preembryos.116 The court
determined that the right of procreational autonomy is composed
of two equal rights: the right to procreate and the right to avoid
procreation.117 The court further held that “[a]n interest in
avoiding genetic parenthood can be significant enough to trigger
the protections afforded to all other aspects of parenthood.”118
The court concluded that because Mary Sue ultimately did not
want to use the preembryos herself, Junior’s right to avoid
procreation outweighed her wish to have the cells donated.119 If
Mary Sue had desired to use the preembryos herself, however,

112

Id. at 596 (holding that a preembryo is not “property” since it has the
“potential for developing into independent human life, even if it is not yet
legally recognizable as human life itself”).
113
Id. at 595 (pointing out that the legality of abortion indicates that while
preembryos “are accorded more respect than mere human cells because of
their burgeoning potential for life . . . they are not given legal status
equivalent to that of a person already born [even though they may have
reached viability]”).
114
Id. at 597 (stating that “preembryos are not, strictly speaking, either
‘persons’ or ‘property,’ but occupy an interim category that entitles them to
special respect because of their potential for human life”).
115
Id. at 596-97. To further emphasize the difference between
preembryos and fetuses, the court pointed out that while “[l]eft undisturbed, a
viable fetus has an excellent chance of being brought to term and born
live . . . a preembryo in a petri dish, [even if] later transferred, has only a 1321 percent chance of achieving implantation.” Id. at 595 n.19.
116
Id. at 597.
117
Id. at 601.
118
Id. at 603 (citing that the courts have previously addressed abortion
cases, which deal with the question of gestational parenthood, as well as
questions pertaining to child-bearing and child-rearing aspects of parenthood).
119
Id. at 604.
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the court would then have considered whether she could have
biological children through alternate means.120
Although the couple did not execute a prior written agreement
as to the disposition of the preembryos upon divorce, the court
nevertheless presumed such agreements to be valid and
enforceable.121 The court found that if the initial contract could be
later modified by mutual accord,122 these agreements would
protect parties against unconscionable risks.123 Furthermore,
enforcement of such agreements would ensure that the
progenitors retain authority over the disposition of their
preembryos.124 The Davis decision was remarkable not only
because it was the first case to address this issue,125 but also
because the court in Davis thoughtfully set forth an analytical
framework for determining the status and fate of frozen
preembryos.

120

Id. (holding that such other means can include attempts at IVF or
adoption).
121
Id. at 597 (stating that the conclusion that agreements should be
enforced is premised on “the proposition that the progenitors, having provided
the gametic material giving rise to the preembryos, retain decision-making
authority as to their disposition”).
122
Id.
123
Id. The court recognized that infertile couples are highly emotional:
[T]he parties’ initial “informed consent” to IVF procedures will often
not be truly informed because of near impossibility of anticipating,
emotionally and psychologically, all the turns that events may take as
the IVF process unfolds. Providing that the initial agreement may
later be modified by agreement will . . . protect the parties
against . . . the risks they face in this regard.
Id.
124
Id.
125
Davis was the first major case to reach a state’s highest court and to
address the problems that arise with frozen preembryo disposition. Although
the couple in the case did not execute a prior written agreement as to the
disposition upon divorce, the court suggested that an agreement could be
sustained so long as it could be modified by mutual accord in the future. Id. at
597, 604.
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B. Kass v. Kass: Court of Appeals of New York, 1998
Six years after the Davis decision, the New York Court of
Appeals supported the validity of predisposition contracts in Kass
v. Kass.126 Like Davis, Kass involved a dispute between a
divorcing couple over their frozen preembryos. The wife wanted
to use the preembryos after the divorce to become pregnant.127
The husband, citing to a consent form the parties signed before
the IVF procedure,128 claimed that the couple had agreed to
donate the preembryos for scientific research.129
The court unanimously held that the consent form signed by
both parties demonstrated the couple’s intent to donate the excess
preembryos to scientific research, and therefore, the agreement
should be enforced.130 Furthermore, it held that agreements in
126

696 N.E.2d 174 (N.Y. 1998) (holding that predisposition agreements
upon the divorce of the progenitors are valid).
127
Id. at 177.
128
Id. at 176. The couple underwent numerous IVF attempts and signed
the consent agreement right before the final procedure. Id. The second part,
entitled “INFORMED CONSENT FORM NO. 2 ADDENDUM NO. 2-1:
CRYOPRESERVATION-STATEMENT OF DISPOSITION,” stated the
following:
We understand that it is IVF Program Policy to obtain our informed
consent to the number of pre-zygotes which are to be cryopreserved
and to the disposition of excess cryopreserved pre-zygotes. We are to
indicate our choices by signing our initials where noted below.
1. We consent to cryopreservation of all pre-zygotes which are not
transferred during this IVF cycle for possible use by us in a future
IVF cycle.
2. In the event that we no longer wish to initiate a pregnancy or are
unable to make a decision regarding the disposition of our stored,
frozen pre-zygotes, we now indicate our desire for the disposition of
our pre-zygotes and direct the IVF program to (choose one):
(b) Our frozen pre-zygotes may be examined by the IVF Program for
biological studies and be disposed of by the IVF Program for
approved research investigation as determined by the IVF Program.
Id. at 176-77 (emphasis in original).
129
Id. at 175, 176-77.
130
Id. at 180. Similarly, other prior written directives, such as living
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general must be enforced to promote important policy goals.131
First, the court found that advance directives encourage parties to
think through possible consequences of their actions and to
carefully detail their wishes in writing.132 Second, such
expressions minimize ambiguity and “maximize procreative
liberty by reserving to the progenitors the authority to make,
what is in the first instance a quintessentially personal [and]
private decision.”133 Third, having enforceable written
agreements ensures the predictability and certainty necessary for
the continuance of IVF programs.134 Lastly, the court recognized
that if the public realizes and understands that courts will enforce
such agreements, it underscores the “seriousness and integrity of
the consent process.”135
Although the Court of Appeals of New York strongly favors
the use of written agreements,136 it suggested in a footnote that
wills and health care proxies, have been enforced. See, e.g., Cohen v. Bolduc,
760 N.E.2d 714, 717-18 (Mass. 2002) (noting that “every State has enacted
legislation permitting individuals to give advance directives for health care
decisions should they become incapable of communicating their own wishes”);
Jill Hollander, Note, Health Care Proxies: New York’s Attempt to Resolve the
Right to Die Dilemma, 57 BROOK. L. REV. 145, 160 (1991) (finding that
forty-two states and the District of Columbia have enacted statutes recognizing
the validity of living wills, which are “[w]ritten directives to the family,
physicians and hospital that life-prolonging treatment should not be
administered in the event the person becomes incompetent”).
131
Kass v. Kass, 696 N.E.2d 174, 180 (N.Y. 1998).
132
Id.
133
Id.
134
Id.
135
Id. The court recognized that all contracts dealing with some future
event are difficult to deal with because they contemplate the unknown. Id.
However, events such as death, divorce, and incapacity make it even more
necessary for the court to uphold advance predisposition agreements since they
reflect the parties’ intent before disputes erupt. “To the extent possible, it
should be the progenitors—not the State and not the courts—who by their prior
directive make this deeply personal life choice.” Id. at 180-81.
136
Id. at 180 (agreeing with the Tennessee Supreme Court in Davis that
agreements between progenitors should be enforced and that “[e]xplicit
agreements avoid costly litigation in business transactions. They are all the
more necessary and desirable in personal matters of reproductive choice,
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had the appellant raised the claim that the agreement was invalid
because of a significant change in circumstances, or that
procreation was no longer desired, it would have been
unenforceable as a violation of public policy.137 Although it is
understandable for any court to refrain from making a per se
rule, this court-created exception renders New York’s approach
as to the enforceability of such contracts undeterminable.138 This
footnote weakens what could have been a powerful position for
the validity of advanced directives. Consequently, couples who
have such covenants are still unable to predict whether their
agreements are enforceable or binding.
C. J.B. v. M.B.: Supreme Court of New Jersey, 2001
In a recent New Jersey Supreme Court decision, the court
reaffirmed the general consensus that agreements are valid in
custody disputes over frozen preembryos despite finding the
specific contract in the case to be invalid because of ambiguity.139
In J.B. v. M.B., the wife, J.B., wanted to destroy the

where the intangible costs of any litigation are simply incalculable.”).
137
Id. at 179 n.4 (stating that the “[p]arties’ agreement may, of course,
be unenforceable as violative of public policy . . . . Significantly changed
circumstances also may preclude contract enforcement.”). The court noted
however, that since these particular arguments and issues were not argued by
Maureen Kass, it would not resolve these outstanding issues in the current
case. Id.
138
This differs from the dictum in Davis, which allowed for modification
of the contract by mutual accord. Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 597
(Tenn. 1992). In Davis, the court presumably would enforce a pre-existing
agreement between the parties despite changed circumstances in the absence of
modification. Id. In contrast, the Kass court reserved the ability to declare a
contract invalid if finding a change of circumstances or intentions. Kass, 696
N.E.2d at 179 n.4. Thus, the Kass court was less deferential to the agreement
between the parties. Arguably it was more deferential to the parties’ present
intent, taking account of changed circumstances. The disposition of
preembryos, however, is best left to the parties’ intentions manifested in an
agreement that they can later modify, rather than the post facto judgment of a
court.
139
See J.B. v. M.B., 783 A.2d 707, 708 (N.J. 2001).
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preembryos while the husband, M.B., urged the court to enforce
the contract they made prior to IVF.140 The contract stated that if
the couple divorced, all unused preembryos would be
relinquished to the custody of the clinic unless there was a
separate determination by the courts as to “who takes control and
direction of the tissues.”141 In arguing for the validity of the
agreement, M.B. insisted that it was the couple’s mutual desire to
give the preembryos to the clinic so that they could be donated to
an infertile couple.142
While the intermediate appellate court held that any
agreement between the parties to use or donate the preembryos
would be unenforceable as a matter of public policy,143 the New
Jersey Supreme Court found no clear agreement between the
parties and the clinic as to the intended disposition of the
preembryos.144 Since there was no clear demonstration as to the
meaning of the agreement, the court concluded that the wife’s
right to avoid procreation was stronger than the husband’s wish
to donate145 and ordered the preembryos destroyed.146 The court
140

Id. at 710.
Id.
142
Id. Furthermore, in his cross-motion, M.B. claimed that, as Catholics,
he and his wife had many long and serious conversations regarding the entire
process, and it was their mutual intention to donate any unused preembryos to
infertile couples. Id.
143
J.B. v. M.B., 751 A.2d 613, 618 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2000)
(holding that even if the agreement was unambiguous, the court would not
compel one gamete donor to become a parent against his or her will and that
“[a]s a matter of public policy . . . forced procreation is not an area amenable
to judicial enforcement”).
144
The court stated that “the thrust of the document signed by J.B. and
M.B. is that the . . . Center obtains control over the preembryos unless the
parties choose otherwise in a writing, or unless a court specifically directs
otherwise in an order of divorce,” and that the agreement contained
conditional language and thus, was ambiguous. J.B., 783 A.2d at 713.
145
Id. at 717 (holding that because the husband retains the capacity to
father children, “M.B.’s right to procreate is not lost if he is denied an
opportunity to use or donate the preembryos . . . . We will not force J.B. to
become a biological parent against her will.”); see also Davis, 842 S.W.2d at
589 (holding that a husband’s right to avoid procreation outweighed a wife’s
desire to donate the preembryos to an infertile couple).
141
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further held that formal, unambiguous contracts adequately
indicating the parties’ intentions are enforceable if each party
maintains the right to change his or her mind about the terms of
disposition in the future.147 The court, however, did not describe
the elements of a disposition agreement that would adequately
indicate the parties’ intention, nor did it specify sufficiently some
of the public policy concerns that would invalidate such
agreements.
Although these three cases demonstrate that the highest state
courts of Tennessee, New York, and New Jersey would likely
enforce clear, unambiguous agreements regarding custody of
frozen preembryos, many other states have yet to address this
issue. This unpredictability as to the courts’ reaction to such
agreements is exacerbated by the fact that other jurisdictions
explicitly reject such contracts.148 As with many issues dealing
with the intricacies of family law, courts may invalidate
146

J.B., 783 A.2d at 720. The court indicated that if M.B. chose to pay
the cost of cryopreservation, it would allow the preembryos to be frozen
indefinitely. Id.
147
Id. Furthermore, although the court did not express an opinion as to
situations in which a party who is no longer fertile seeks the use of the stored
preembryos against the wishes of his or her partner, the court noted that
adoption might be a consideration in future judicial determinations over the
custody of frozen preembryos as an alternative to infertile individuals
attempting to have children. Id. Not only is this concept fatally flawed but it
also restricts one’s freedom to procreate. Although the law recognizes adopted
children as having the same legal status as if they were biological, in this
context, the possibility of having one’s own biological children by gaining
custody of his or her frozen preembryos should not be equated with the
possibility of adoption for various reasons. See, e.g., David L. Theyssen,
Note, Balancing Interests in Frozen Embryo Disputes: Is Adoption Really a
Reasonable Alternative?, 74 IND. L.J. 711, 724-29 (1999) (noting that
adoption for many prospective parents can be difficult and can cost as much as
IVF; hence, courts should not assume that a party may just adopt to achieve
parenthood without sufficient evidence verifying the likelihood of this
possibility).
148
A.Z. v. B.Z., 725 N.E.2d 1051, 1051 (Mass. 2000) (holding that even
if disposition agreements were clear and unambiguous, the court will not
compel one to become a parent against his or her will as a matter of public
policy).
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agreements because of public policy.149 This should not,
however, be taken to mean that the legislatures cannot design
statutes that provide clear and informative model consent
agreements. With such legislative actions, even if the courts
invalidate agreements because of specific public policy conflicts,
the agreement, at least, would not be void because of ambiguous
terms.
In fact, it would be more beneficial to the IVF industry if
agreements were invalidated for public policy reasons rather than
for ambiguous terms. Invalidating agreements because of public
policy concerns gives clinics, attorneys, and IVF participants an
understanding that contracts should not be used because the
courts will not accept such arrangements. Voiding disposition
agreements because of ambiguous terms or circumstances,
however, as many courts have done, does little to provide
guidance to future parties and still leaves open the question as to
what constitutes an agreement that will be upheld by the courts.150
Without direction from state laws as to the validity of such
agreements or guidance as to an appropriate, enforceable
contract, courts will continue to provide a non-uniform body of
law. This lack of uniform guidance will continue until
legislatures enact comprehensive statutes that will sufficiently
maximize procreative rights and define the status of a preembryo.
III. LEGISLATION
Currently, the federal government minimally regulates the
IVF industry.151 The existing regulations were drafted in response
to public outcry for correct statistical data in Assisted

149

Shapiro, supra note 7, at 118.
See, e.g., J.B., 783 A.2d at 714 (stating that “a formal, unambiguous
memorialization of the parties’ intentions would be required to confirm their
joint determination”).
151
Meena Lal, Comment, The Role of the Federal Government in Assisted
Reproductive Technologies, 13 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J.
517, 533 (1997) (indicating that the Assisted Reproductive Technology
Programs Act is the only federal act regulating the industry).
150
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Reproductive Technology (“ART”) procedures,152 rather than as
a result of congressional action. In the late 1980s, the general
public expressed concern that some IVF clinics exaggerated their
success rates.153 These allegations by IVF participants and critics
eventually led Congress to pass the Fertility Clinic Success Rate
and Certification Act of 1992.154 The act, among other things,
requires clinics to report annually its pregnancy rates and
authorizes the Center for Disease Control to develop and oversee
certification procedures of IVF facilities.155 Despite the federal
government’s attempt to protect IVF participants,156 the federal
statute fails both to keep up with the growing advances in ART
procedures and to address core ethical issues.157 In fact, the lack
152

Id. (noting that the federal act was enacted to require the reporting of
success rates and for the development of a state-run certification program of
embryo laboratories); see also Note, In Vitro Fertilization: Insurance and
Consumer Protection, 109 HARV. L. REV. 2092, 2106 (1996) (noting that
“[t]he number of clinical pregnancies achieved also matters to consumers
because, by comparing that number to the number of live births, a woman can
estimate her risk of experiencing the physical and emotional traumas of
miscarriage”).
153
Kenneth Baum, Golden Eggs: Towards the Rational Regulation of
Oocyte Donation, 2001 BYU L. REV. 107, 124 (2001) (noting that the enacted
laws merely provide for medical screening guidelines, clinical reports and
insurance coverage guidelines).
154
42 U.S.C. § 263 (2001). The act was proposed on November 26, 1991
and passed on October 8, 1992. See H.R. REP. NO. 102-1096, at 26 (1992).
The House report states that the purpose of the act is to “provide the public
with comparable information on the effectiveness of infertility services and to
assure the quality of these services by providing for the certification of embryo
laboratories.” Id.
155
See 42 U.S.C. § 263[a-1]–[a-7] (2001).
156
By requiring the reporting of success rates, the enactment of the
Assisted Reproductive Technology Programs Act protects the public from
potentially misleading information from fertility laboratories and clinics about
their statistics and ability to help infertile couples conceive.
157
ART advances that have yet to be fully addressed by federal regulation
include the following: (1) Gamete Intrafallopian Transfer (“GIFT”), where
fertilization occurs in the body rather than in a laboratory as in IVF; (2)
Zygote Intrafallopian Transfer (“ZIFT”), where the preembryos are placed
directly into the fallopian tube; and (3) cryopreservation, the freezing and
storage of bodily cells. See, e.g., Jean M. Eggen, The “Orwellian Nightmare”
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of federal legislation regarding the legal status of frozen
preembryos and the validity of predisposition contracts suggests a
conscious decision by the federal government to avoid the issue.
This failure has caused a great deal of discrepancy and
inconsistency among the states.158
The ART and IVF industries are subject to many different
standards of compliance created by different statutory laws.159
Statutes, such as those enacted in Louisiana160 and New
Mexico,161 that protects preembryos create problems for the
Reconsidered: A Proposed Regulatory Framework for the Advanced
Reproductive Technologies, 25 GA. L. REV. 625, 628-32, 635-37 (1991).
158
Currently, nine states have enacted statutes that attempt to resolve
some of the problems associated with IVF. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.17 (West
2001) (requiring the commissioning couple and the treating physician to enter
into a written agreement that provides for the disposition of the cells in the
event of death, divorce, or other unforeseen circumstances); 720 ILL. COMP.
STAT. 510/6(7) (2001) (providing that no person shall sell or experiment on a
human ovum unless it is therapeutic to the fetus produced thereby); KAN
STAT. ANN. § 65-6702 (2000) (allowing the use of any drug or device that
prevents implantation of an embryo); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 311.715
(Banks-Baldwin 2001) (prohibiting the use of public funds for IVF treatment if
such procedures result in the intentional destruction of a human embryo); LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:129 (West 2001) (providing that an in vitro fertilized
human ovum exists as a juridical person and shall not be intentionally
destroyed); MO. ANN. STAT. § 1.205(1) (West 2001) (providing that life
begins at the moment of conception); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 168-B:1,
B:13-16 (2001) (defining terms of eligibility for IVF treatment, limiting the
usage of preembryos, and requiring the judicial pre-authorization of all written
consent agreements); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-9A-[1]-[7] (Michie 2001)
(stating that all preembryos created must be implanted); PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
18, § 3213 (2001) (providing for IVF reporting requirements).
159
Andrews, supra note 79, at 406. Without clear, uniform laws among
the states, physicians are reluctant to perform such procedures since it is
uncertain whether they may be prosecuted for any subsequent loss of
preembryos. See also Jadrnack, supra note 9 (noting that in New Mexico with
“the absence of clear law, fertility clinics find themselves wondering exactly
where their liability lies”).
160
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:126, 129 (West 2001) (finding that an in
vitro fertilized human ovum exists as a juridical person and cannot be
destroyed intentionally).
161
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-9A-[1]-[7] (stating that all preembryos created
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continued use of IVF.162 When left to create their own laws,
states may create “vague duties for physicians or establish
extremely high standards of care . . . [which] may make it
unlikely that physicians will offer the techniques.”163 Louisiana’s
statute making preembryos “juridical person[s],”164 for example,
may deter specialists from even offering the most basic IVF
procedure for fear of future prosecution by the state.
On the otherhand, Florida’s statute is the antithesis of
Louisiana and New Mexico’s implantation requirement. Florida
allows for the destruction of preembryos and encourages parties
to sign predisposition agreements prior to IVF in cases of
divorce, death, or any other unforeseeable circumstances.165 If a
written agreement is absent, the custody of the gametes will

must be implanted and thus cannot be intentionally destroyed).
162
For example, the state of Illinois enacted a law providing that
physicians who fertilized a woman’s egg outside her body “shall, [for
purposes of an 1877 child abuse act] with regard to the human being thereby
produced, be deemed to have the care and custody of a child.” Andrews,
supra note 79, at 398. As one can imagine, this statute created great
hindrances for IVF doctors in the state. Id. The main concern was that
physicians were uncertain as to how the courts would interpret the extent of
their care over the preembryos. Id. In an industry where simple procedures
could potentially destroy an embryo, physicians were concerned that routine
processes, such as the freezing and thawing of extra preembryos, would be
considered a prosecutable offense. Id.
163
Id. at 399-400.
164
See supra note 34. “As a juridical person, the . . . ovum shall be given
an identification by the medical facility . . . which entitles such ovum to sue or
be sued.” LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:124. One author defines Louisiana’s
“juridical person” status to preembryos as that which grants such cells the
right to subsist; therefore, they cannot be intentionally destroyed. Kevin U.
Stephens, Reproductive Capacity: What Does the Embryo Get? 24 S.U. L.
REV. 263, 269 (1997).
165
See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.17 (providing that “[a] commissioning
couple and the treating physician shall enter into a written agreement that
provides for the disposition of the commissioning couple’s eggs, sperm and
preembryos in the event of a divorce, death of a spouse, or any other
unforeseen circumstance”). See also KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-6702
(complimenting the Florida statute in considering the disposal of preembryos
lawful when the donors jointly decide it).
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remain with the individual who provided them.166 In cases dealing
with preembryos, decision-making authority regarding disposition
must be based on the mutual consent of both parties.167 In
addition to mandating predisposition agreements, Florida is the
only state that has enacted legislation that explicitly recognizes
the validity of these contracts.168
Intervention by state legislatures to create some consistency
and uniformity among the states is inevitable.169 Although some
states have enacted their own statutes as a result of the absence of
federal guidelines, many of these statutes differ greatly as to the
definition of life, the rights and status of a preembryo, and the
ability of IVF participants to choose the fate and disposition of
their gametes.
IV. ANALYSIS
With only a vague line of U.S. Supreme Court cases
addressing issues of abortion and the right to procreate (some
dating back well over twenty years), and with virtually no
guidance from the federal government, it is no surprise that the
current state of the law over frozen preembryos is unsettled.
Although some states have made a valiant attempt to address this
issue by enacting their own legislation,170 statutes that mandate
implantation, such as those in Louisiana and New Mexico, are
problematic.171 The right to procreate is significant, and this
dilemma can only be alleviated with contractual enforcement.
Since contracts can be invalidated if they violate public policy
166

See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.17(1).
See id. § 742.17(2).
168
Coleman, supra note 32, at 74.
169
Ellen Waldman, Disputing over Embryos: Of Contracts and Consents,
32 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 897, 940 (2000) (arguing that the legislation be enacted to
oversee the contracting process in order to achieve its assumed goal of
enhancing procreative liberty).
170
See discussion infra Part III (discussing and comparing the Florida,
Louisiana, and New Mexico statutes).
171
See discussion infra Part III (discussing why certain state statutes are
problematic).
167
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or constitutional principles, legislators should provide guidelines
for appropriate disposition agreements. Advance disposition
agreements provide individuals with the opportunity to set forth
and establish their own personal interests, viewpoints, and ethics
for either procreation or the avoidance of procreation. If statutes
similar to Florida’s are enacted, the participants’ interests, as
reflected by their agreement, would be the courts’ primary
concern if litigation occurs. Advance directives, therefore,
sidestep the need to classify preembryos as either persons or
property. The court need only determine the circumstances and
intent of the parties prior to signing the agreement.172
Furthermore, only a statute such as Florida’s can withstand
constitutional scrutiny because it does not force one to procreate
against his or her will and ensures that prior agreements
respecting the participants’ wishes are enforced.
A. Mandatory Implantation Requirements Infringe on
Procreative Rights
Those states that mandate the implantation of preembryos
generally perceive the cells as “persons.”173 Once the legal status
of a preembryo is upgraded by statute to that of a “person,” a
legitimate interest is created requiring the state’s protection.174
Furthermore, mandatory preembryo donation may have
considerable impact on IVF and may deter couples from
participating in treatment altogether. This may rob them of their
chance to ever reproduce.175 Louisiana’s statute mandating
implantation or donation severely limits the choices available to
the gamete providers.176 Furthermore, all options that are valid
under Louisiana law have grave detrimental consequences for the
172

See Robertson, supra note 59, at 414.
See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:129 (providing that an in vitro
fertilized human ovum exists as a juridical person and shall not be
intentionally destroyed); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-9A-[1]-[7] (stating that all
preembryos created cannot be harmed and, thus, cannot be destroyed).
174
Arado, supra note 15, at 252.
175
See Andrews, supra note 79, at 400.
176
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:129.
173
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participants. In Louisiana, the couple can either give up their
preembryos for adoption and suffer the psychological burden of
knowing that their biological children exist somewhere,177 or they
can use all of their preembryos to avoid donation and incur a
dangerous risk to the woman’s health if multiple pregnancies
occur.178
Although Louisiana’s statute holds that a preembryo exists as
a “juridical person,”179 to bestow this legal status upon these cells
is problematic under current caselaw. One concern is that even
fetuses, which are more advanced and developed than
preembryos,180 are not held to be persons under the United States
Supreme Court decisions181 interpreting the Constitution182 or
177

Robertson, supra note 59, at 405.
Id. See discussion infra note 224.
179
See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:129 (West 2001).
180
Once the zygote, a fertilized egg, is formed, it begins to divide and
attaches itself to the uterine wall while it continues to divide for a period of
eight weeks. See Stephens, supra note 164, at 266-67. Only after the main
organs are developed has the preembryo become a fetus. See id. at 267. See
also Joel N. Ephross, Note, In Vitro Fertilization: Perspectives on Current
Issues, 32 JURIMETRICS J. 447, 459 (1992) (stating that “[a]n embryo may
have a unique genetic identity, but lack the ‘cluster of features’ associated with
a person; or, lack sufficient potential for development to be cognizant of
independent protection”).
181
See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 857 (1992)
(holding that personal autonomy recognizes limits on governmental power to
mandate medical treatment); City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reprod.
Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 438 n.27 (1983) (holding that the state is free to
require certain types of abortions to be performed only in hospitals); Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 156-59 (1973) (noting that “no case could be cited that
holds that a fetus is a person within the meaning of the Fourteenth
Amendment”); Roe, 410 U.S. at 162 (stating that “the unborn have never been
recognized in the law as persons in the whole sense”); Eisenstadt v. Baird,
405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (stating that “[i]f the right of privacy means
anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from
unwarranted government intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a
person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child”).
182
U.S. CONST. AMEND. XIV, § 1. The Fourteenth Amendment of the
U.S. Constitution provides that no state shall “deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law, nor deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” Id.
178
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among the scientific community.183 In Roe v. Wade, the Supreme
Court specifically held that the state’s interest in potential life
should only be considered from the point of viability.184
Furthermore, scientific data supports the notion that pregnancy
does not occur at the moment of conception but rather at the
point when the preembryo attaches to the uterine wall.185 Under
the Roe precedent, therefore, it is troubling that Louisiana’s
statute deeming frozen preembryos as separate legal entities
would withstand constitutional scrutiny since the preembryos are
neither attached to a uterine wall nor within in a woman’s womb.
Despite this troubling concept, however, statutes defining
preembryos as “juridical persons” may be held constitutional
since such laws are distinct from “right to abortion” cases.186
Under current caselaw, states can define preembryos and fetuses
as persons with protective rights so long as their interpretation
does not interfere with a woman’s bodily integrity.187 Louisiana’s
definition of a preembryo, therefore, may withstand
constitutional scrutiny since frozen preembryos are not sustained
in a woman’s body and will not trigger the privacy interests
enunciated in Roe.188
Statutes that define preembryos as persons and require
mandatory implantation of cells interfere with a person’s
procreative rights and thus, may offend the Fourteenth
Amendment.189 The Supreme Court has held that procreation is

183

Roe, 410 U.S. at 153.
Id. at 160. Viability is usually held to be the time when the fetus
reaches twenty-eight weeks or about seven months. Id.
185
Guzman, supra note 27, at 207. Since fetuses are not recognized as
persons under the law, one must ask if a frozen preembryo within a glass tube,
sustained only with the use of liquid nitrogen, can be recognized as an
independent entity by any state or court.
186
Rao, supra note 90, at 1479.
187
Id.
188
Melchoir, supra note 30, at 950 (noting that since frozen preembryos
exist in petri dishes, “[t]he bodily integrity of the woman would not be
breached if she were not allowed to destroy her frozen embryos as it would be
if she were not allowed to have an abortion”).
189
U.S. CONST. AMEND. XIV, § 1. See also Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113
184

YANGMACRO4-29.DOC

620

7/16/02 2:33 PM

JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY

“fundamental”190 and “one of the basic civil rights of
[persons].”191 To interfere with this right, therefore, requires a
compelling state interest.192 Although disputes over frozen
preembryos differ from the previous cases addressed by the
Supreme Court, absent language or decisions to the contrary,
there is no reason to suspect that the right to procreate or avoid
procreation with respect to IVF violates the fundamental
freedoms established by the Court. Directives that force couples
to either use their preembryos or forfeit them for adoptive
implantation restricts one’s freedom to procreate or avoid
procreation.193
Another problem with mandatory implantation statutes is that
they “infringe on procreative rights of IVF participants without
identifying an interest that the state seeks to protect.”194 To justify
this interference with procreative liberties, the burden of proof is
on the government to demonstrate that there is both the
compelling need for the law and that the restriction is not overly
broad.195 Although the state can argue that it has an interest in
protecting life, this purported interest is not compelling under
current caselaw or scientific opinions. It is not practical,
moreover, since preembryos have not reached the minimum

(1973).
190

Id. at 156.
Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (holding that an
Oklahoma statute that provided for the sterilization of criminals who were
convicted more than two times for certain felonies was unconstitutional on the
grounds of equal protection since convicted felons were not treated equally).
192
See Roe, 410 U.S. at 155. The Court, citing Kramer v. Union Free
Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 627 (1969), held that where fundamental rights are
concerned, limiting these rights can only be justified by a “compelling state
interest.” Id.
193
See Clifton Perry & L. Kristen Schneider, Cryopreserved Embryos:
Who Shall Decide Their Fate? 13 J. LEGAL MED. 463, 469-74 (1992)
(providing a constitutional analysis of landmark cases that have established an
individual’s right to procreate and avoid procreation).
194
Cynthia Reilly, Constitutional Limits on New Mexico’s In Vitro
Fertilization Law, 24 N.M. L. REV. 125, 128 (1994).
195
See Andrews, supra note 79, at 400.
191
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developmental stage necessary to constitute “life.”196
Furthermore, statutes that require gamete providers to donate
their preembryos to other couples for implantation serve as a dual
infringement on procreative rights. If couples choose not to use
their preembryos, not only must they relinquish their rights in
determining the disposition of their own biological DNA, but also
by mandating implantation, they face having a biological child
carried and reared by a complete stranger. Mandated
implantation requirements “place upon gamete providers the
burden of knowing that they may have a living genetically related
child.”197 This strikes at the very notion of individual rights and
procreative freedom. This also may lead to great judicial
inefficiencies when courts are constantly called upon to make ad
hoc determinations regarding the best interest of the child in each
and every case.198
As the Tennessee Supreme Court noted, unlike a viable fetus
in its mother’s womb who has an excellent chance of being
brought to term and born alive, a preembryo that is transferred
by IVF has only a 13% to 21% chance of achieving
implantation.199 Even if implanted successfully, only 56% to 75%
of these pregnancies result in live births.200 Moreover, despite the
presumed statutory goal of maternal and fetal protection,201
mandatory implantation may actually work to the detriment of

196

See Elizabeth G. Patterson, Human Rights and Human Life: An
Uneven Fit, 68 TUL. L. REV. 1527, 1529, 1550 (1994) (“[A] human who has
not yet been born, reached viability, or satisfied some other criterion for the
beginning of life, is not considered a person in whom human rights
inhere . . . . Traditionally, the law has not treated the fetus as a person.”).
197
Elisa K. Poole, Comment, Allocation of Decision-Making Rights to
Frozen Embryos, 4 AM. J. FAM. L. 67, 75 (1990).
198
Bill E. Davidoff, Comment, Frozen Embryos: A Need for Thawing in
the Legislative Process, 47 SMU L. REV. 131, 140 (1993).
199
Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 595 n.19 (Tenn. 1992).
200
Id.
201
Bruce Nolan, LA Rejects OK on Embryo Tests, NEW ORLEANS TIMESPICAYUNE, Oct. 2, 1994, available at 1994 WL 3864404 (stating that
“Louisiana law prohibits the production of embryos for any other purpose but
creating a child”).
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both beings.202 By substituting a physician’s individualized
decision-making judgment as to the best interest of the woman
with a legislative mandate, these statutes may harm the recipient
by forcing the implantation of less suitable preembryos.203 In
addition, the Supreme Court has recognized that the “full
vindication of the woman’s fundamental right necessarily requires
that her physician be given ‘the room he needs to make his best
medical judgment.’”204 Without devising a mechanism for
medical conventions, these statutes invite burdensome medical
predicaments and may frustrate the established “medical
protocol[s] designed to ensure the health of the mother or fetus
that might discourage a physician from implanting every
[pre]embryo.”205 Even though the state may require implantation,
the possible risk of multiple gestations may “require a mother
and her physician to abort some or all of the fetuses after the
preembryos are implanted.”206 There is no doubt that such an
occurrence would defeat the purpose of having a statute in the
first place.
Although Louisiana’s law seems to protect these “persons,” it
does not provide clear guidelines for preembryos after they are
donated.207 While adoption laws exist to guard the interests of
children already born,208 states that mandate preembryo donation
202

Reilly, supra note 194, at 128.
Stephens, supra note 164, at 269 (claiming that if Louisiana does not
modify its position of treating preembryos as juridical persons, “modifications
in the law need to be made to allow for . . . defective preembryos and other
tort problems such as medical liability”).
204
City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reprod. Health, Inc., 462 U.S.
416, 427 (quoting Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 192 (1973)).
205
Id.
206
Id.
207
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:129.
208
While there are agencies to protect adopted or foster children, it is
unclear whether such precautions are taken to ensure that adoptive parents of
frozen preembryos are providing safe and healthy environments for the
resulting children. See, e.g., The New York State Department of Health,
Adoption and Medical Information Registry, available at http://www.health.
state.ny.us/nysdoh/vr/reginfo.htm (last visited Apr. 28, 2002) (stating that the
web site provides three services that do the following: (1) help adoptees obtain
203
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do not have similar protections to secure the interests of children
conceived from anonymously donated preembryos.209 This lack of
state legislation can have a severe impact on everyone involved.
Issues such as unknown medical histories,210 possible abuse and
information about their birth parents; (2) facilitate the exchange of information
between adoptees and their birth parents; and (3) enable adoptees to obtain
medical information). While many states have agencies that oversee the
process of adoption and provide services for adoptees to obtain crucial
information about their medical history and past, there does not seem to be
similar authorities for children born from donated preembryos. To adopt a
child in New York State, adoptive parents must meet certain conditions, obtain
consent from appropriate authorities, and comply with general provisions
relating to adoptions. See New York State Bar Association, Adoption in New
York, available at http://www.nysba.org/public/ pamphlets/adoption.html (last
visited Apr. 28, 2002). There are no similar precautions and monitoring
authorities established for donated preembryos.
209
See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32A-5-[2] & [3] (2001) (establishing a
framework for child protection, economic security and legal equivalency for
adoptive children but defining an “adoptee” as “a person who is the subject of
an adoption petition”). Frozen preembryos given to surrogate parents are not
within the definition of “adoptee” under the act, and, thus, they do not seem
to be protected under New Mexico adoption laws.
210
In addition to the possibility of intermarriage, most preembryos will be
adopted and carried to term anonymously. See Heidi Forster, The Legal and
Ethical Debate Surrounding the Storage and Destruction of Frozen Human
Embryos: A Reaction to the Mass Disposal in Britain and the Lack of Law in
the United States, 76 WASH. U. L.Q. 759, 760 (1998) (noting that one option
for fertility clinics is to give the preembryos anonymously to other couples
who carry them to gestation). Thus, adoptive parents would most likely not
have knowledge of the child’s biological lineage or medical history. This may
pose serious medical concerns for the child in the future. Dennis J. Doherty,
Frozen Embryos: The Birth of a Legal Controversy, 65 WIS. LAW. 15, 17
(1992) (noting that states could apply their adoption framework to cases of
frozen preembryos so that such precautions and genetic relations could be
recorded to resolve potential problems). Without knowledge of the child’s
propensity for inheritable disorders, physicians and the child’s surrogate
parents are not in the best position to make medical decisions on their behalf.
Id. Although this lack of knowledge is true even in traditional adoptions, with
the issue of mandatory adoption of frozen preembryos, the state can rectify
this potential problem by making allowances for the disclosure of medical
background information of the gamete providers prior to them giving up their
preembryos for adoption. Unfortunately, it appears that these statutes do not
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neglect by unfit surrogate parents,211 the increased number of
dispersed biological siblings,212 and the possibility of
intermarriage213 or incest214 are all questions that the statutes of
Louisiana and New Mexico are ill-prepared to address.
The possibility for abuse and neglect, moreover, may be
magnified in states where couples are required to donate their
preembryos to surrogate parents who have not been effectively
screened.215 For example, in one tragic occurrence in
Pennsylvania, a bachelor, James Austin, hired a surrogate mother
to carry his child.216 The Infertility Center of America (“ICA”)
matched Austin with a surrogate who was impregnated with his

make such authorizations or considerations before forcing these couples to
donate.
211
See, e.g., Huddleston v. Infertility Ctr. of Am., 700 A.2d 453 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1997) (holding that the surrogate mother did have standing to sue
for the wrongful death of her newborn even though she was paid by the baby’s
father, a bachelor, to carry his child to term).
212
Unlike sperm banks that have enacted policies to reduce the possibility
of multiple children from one donor by setting limits to the number of children
a donor can father or mandating that his sperm not be released to a woman
within the same area, there are no visible safeguards for adopted preembryos.
See, e.g., Rainbow Flag Health Service, Known Donor Insemination,
available at http://www.gayspermbank.com (last visited Apr. 28, 2002)
(claiming that its sperm bank limits the use of donor sperm to impregnate only
four women). See also The Sperm Bank of NY, Inc., Become a BioGenetics
Exclusive Donor, available at http://www.sperm1.com (last visited Apr. 28,
2002) (limiting the number of pregnancies from a specific sperm donor to two
per state in non-anonymous donations). As such, it may be possible for women
in the same county or even town to implant and gestate biological siblings
without knowledge or consideration of the possible future ramifications.
Furthermore, it seems none of the states keep records tracking how many
“sibling” preembryos are implanted and result in births. This lack of clear
precautions and data keeping opens the door to the possibility of incest and
familial strains upon all persons involved.
213
Andrews, supra note 16, at 80-83.
214
Id.
215
See, e.g., supra note 208.
216
Huddleston v. Infertility Ctr. of Am., 700 A.2d 453 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1997).
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sperm.217 An ICA representative even accompanied Austin when
he went to the delivery room to claim his newborn son.218 Austin,
in addition, received counseling and assistance from the clinic
that matched him with the surrogate. Despite these efforts,
Austin killed the newborn shortly after its birth.219
States with mandatory implantation statutes value preembryos
as “persons” and believe that such restrictions would result in
born life.220 Given the current state of abortion laws in this
country221 and the lack of demand for donated preembryos,222
Louisiana’s goal to promote life by mandating implantation seems
futile.223 If a couple in Louisiana or New Mexico wishes to
destroy the preembryos rather than donate them, they can
exercise their right to implant the preembryos and subsequently
terminate the pregnancy by a legal abortion.224 Moreover, couples
217

Id.
Id. at 456.
219
Id. at 455.
220
Nolan, supra note 201.
221
As with the right to procreate, there is an equally large number of
cases supporting the notion of the right to avoid procreation. See, e.g.,
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (holding that a Connecticut
statute prohibiting the use of contraceptives was unconstitutional because it
invaded the privacy rights of married couples); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S.
438 (1972) (extending the holding of Griswold to establish the right to privacy
for unmarried couples); Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 687
(1977) (holding that “[r]ead in light of its progeny, the teaching of Griswold is
that the Constitution protects individual decisions in matters of childbearing
from unjustified intrusions by the State”).
In Roe, the Court found that this right extended to include abortion
decisions. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). In expanding privacy rights to
include the right of abortion, the Court considered the negative consequences
that would result should the right to terminate an unwanted pregnancy be
infringed by the government. Id. at 153. This reasoning supports the notion
that the right not to procreate should be respected by the government and that
the state’s interest in the potential life of preembryos is insufficient to justify
forced adoptive implantation. See supra Part IV.A.
222
Coleman, supra note 32, at 64.
223
Nolan, supra note 201.
224
Although this situation is highly impractical and unlikely to occur, this
scheme is perfectly permissible and legal under Louisiana and New Mexico
218
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can simply go to a different jurisdiction where the restrictions
and regulations are better suited to their own principles to
undergo IVF. Whatever minimal interest the state has in potential
life is further undermined by the low probability that the birth of
a child would result by the prohibition on abandonment.225 Thus,
it is not clear that retaining these preembryos for donation will
accomplish the state’s goal in yielding more births. Given all
these deterrents, it seems that the goal of encouraging new life is
futile.226
B. Benefits of Advance Disposition Agreements
As an alternative to the harsh statutes of Louisiana and New
Mexico, the Florida statute mandating the validity and use of
disposition agreements provides the best means for resolving
some of the most difficult disputes over frozen preembryos.
Enforcing such agreements provides maximum procreative
liberty and ensures that IVF participants fully consider the
ramifications of their actions. As long as couples have the ability
to modify the agreement whenever they change their minds, the
contract should be valid and enforced.
There are some courts227 as well as scholars228 who believe
that advance disposition agreements should not be enforced
state laws and would allow couples to circumvent inane mandatory
implantation requirements.
225
See Guzman, supra note 27, at 219.
226
See Coleman, supra note 32, at 64.
227
See, e.g., J.B. v. M.B., 783 A.2d 707, 708 (N.J. 2001) (holding that
even if the husband and wife had entered into an unambiguous agreement
regarding their frozen preembryos, because it is against public policy, the
agreement would not be enforced); A.Z. v. B.Z., 725 N.E.2d 1051, 1059
(Mass. 2000) (holding that the court would not enforce an agreement that
would compel one donor to become a parent against his or her will as a matter
of public policy).
228
See Coleman, supra note 32, at 57; see also Note, Rumpelstiltskin
Revisited: The Inalienable Rights of Surrogate Mothers, 99 HARV. L. REV.
136, 1941 (1986) (noting that “[b]ecause the law permits different methods of
disposal for different rights, courts cannot rely on some imagined internal
structure or logic in a system of rights to deduce inalienability”).
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because they violate public policy or infringe upon one’s freedom
to procreate.229 Many argue that because advance agreements are
decided prior to IVF, they should not be binding upon individuals
who subsequently change their minds as to the disposition method
originally selected.230 Although the individual’s circumstances
and state of mind prior to and after IVF may drastically change,
human indecisiveness and uncertainty are variables in any
contract.231 While individuals may be indecisive about the
disposition of their frozen preembryos, this issue requires
prudent decision-making and predictability. As with every
contract, individuals should understand the terms of the
agreement and anticipate possible circumstances.232 Divorce,
death of the participants, and the possibility of future infertility
are all conceivable situations, and the effect of these events can
be provided for in a written agreement. Contracting encourages
potential parents to consider these possibilities and decide
disposition issues prior to creating preembryos or dissolving the
relationship.
Furthermore, courts have enforced agreements within the
familial setting.233 Like antenuptial agreements234 or divorce
stipulations, disposition agreements provide individuals with
229

See Coleman, supra note 32, at 66 (arguing that such disposition
agreements are unenforceable because they attempt to restrict rights that are
inalienable).
230
See id.
231
Susan B. Apel, Disposition of Frozen Embryos: Are Contracts the
Solution?, 27 VER. B.J. & L. DIG. 29, 32 (2001).
232
Id. at 31-32.
233
Id. at 32.
234
Id. An antenuptial agreement is defined as follows:
A written contract between two people who are about to marry,
setting out the terms of possession of assets, treatment of future
earnings, control of the property of each, and potential division if the
marriage is later dissolved. These are fairly common if either or both
parties have substantial assets, children from a previous marriage,
potential large inheritances, high incomes, or have been “taken” by a
prior spouse.
Law.Com Dictionary, available at http://dictionary.law.com (last visited Apr.
28, 2002).
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predictability and assurance that prior consensus will be honored.
Although antenuptial agreements and divorce stipulations focus
on establishing economic stability and certainty while disposition
agreements address more personal issues, both types of
agreements carry similar psychological, emotional, and financial
burdens. Much like any other binding agreement pertaining to
one’s personal life, an advance disposition contract will always
be emotional and difficult.
Despite the possible stress of executing such agreements on
couples, contracts determining the disposition of the preembryos
provide them with relief from the current state of legal limbo.
The benefits of contractual agreements in relation to frozen
preembryos are multifold. First, contractual agreements set out a
coherent legal framework for participants in which they can
address the possibilities and circumstances that may occur as a
result of creating preembryos. Florida’s statute recognizing the
validity of such agreements allows people to conform their
conduct to the rules set out by the legislature beforehand and, if
the rules are not to their liking, to forgo IVF altogether.235
Second, agreements permit couples to decide the fate of their
gametes in a way that conforms to their personal feelings and
beliefs. Florida’s statute, which requires couples to decide the
fate of their preembryos before they are created,236 ensures that
the parties discuss issues that are of personal significance to them
and guarantees that the contract best reflects their concerns.
Agreements ensure that the individual progenitor’s values and
beliefs are incorporated into the agreement from the beginning.
By enforcing agreements, advance directives also reduce the
possibility that the parties will be forced to accept a neveranticipated result since both parties provided consent. This
mutual agreement should be respected and enforced by the state
and the courts rather than be taken apart and scrutinized by third
parties unrelated to the dispute or concerns of the parties
involved.
Third, advance disposition agreements promote practicality
235
236

Apel, supra note 231, at 32.
Id.
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and efficiency. By encouraging IVF participants to sign
enforceable agreements, courts would no longer be called upon
each time a dispute arises. When a dispute occurs without an
agreement in place, not only will one party lose custody of the
preembryos, but everyone involved will be forced to pay legal
fees and await judicial appeals.237 While the caselaw on such
disputes is inadequate to address these issues, statutes are the best
means to resolve potential conflicts and promote judicial
efficiency. In order to maximize the benefits of the agreements,
IVF participants must have assurances from the legislature and
the courts that the agreements will be valid and enforceable. If
statutes explicitly mandate advance contracts and provide for
their enforceability, there will be fewer disputes over frozen
preembryos.238 Because frozen preembryos are unique and can
have great impact on the lives of the parties involved, the need
for greater legislative guidance and enforcement is compelling.
V. PROPOSAL
The federal legislature’s lack of guidance regarding frozen
preembryo disposition has forced the states to address this issue,
creating uncertain and inconsistent results nationwide.239 This
lapse in the interpretation of state law is the greatest threat to the
IVF industry, forcing physicians and participants to wonder about
the legality of their actions and the disposition of their genes.240
Having familial disputes resolved before gestation to ensure a
consistent and stable environment for future growth and
development benefits preembryos. Laws mandating their
disposition, therefore, are important to provide individuals with
proper notice as to the potential liabilities that may arise from
their actions and to establish a stable home environment for a
child conceived by IVF.

237

Id.
Id.
239
See id.
240
See discussion supra note 162 (discussing instances where physicians
are unclear as to the legal implications of IVF and its processes).
238
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The primary reason for the need to clarify legal parentage
before birth is to ensure that there is a secure home for the child.
The current law regarding legal parentage of preembryos created
by ARTs poses danger to a child because it leaves the question of
who his or her parents are unanswered. The confusion over who
has the decision-making authority and responsibility for the child
is the most significant risk. Establishing clear legal parentage is
important in defining the relationship between the child, donors,
surrogate mothers, and the intended rearing parents. Despite the
desperate situation with regard to frozen preembryos in the law,
the federal government has still refused to tackle these issues.
Although states have enacted their own statutes, many of these
laws are constitutionally questionable.241
Florida’s approach to this debate is the best solution because
it encourages prudent decision-making and would give the gamete
providers predictability.242 This approach ensures that neither
party will be forced to sustain a highly unanticipated or greatly
compromised outcome. By allowing couples to choose whether to
carry the preembryo to term or to destroy it, the Florida statute
maximizes procreative freedom by giving decision-making
authority to the individuals who provided the gametes.243
Florida’s statute appropriately gives IVF participants this
authority, as they are directly affected by any resulting
disposition of the preembryos.244
Although Florida’s statute is the best statute currently
available, some amendments could be incorporated. First, to

241

See supra Part III (discussing certain state statutes that may be
constitutionally questionable because they overly restrict one’s right to
procreate).
242
See supra note 7 (noting that such agreements would enable the couple
to determine the disposition of their cells).
243
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.17 (West 2001). This mutual agreement,
solidified in a written agreement, ensures that the preembryos will be disposed
of in a manner consistent with both progenitors’ wishes.
244
See Eggen, supra note 157, at 700 (noting that the intervention of third
parties “causes the donor couple to relinquish at least a portion of their interest
in reproductive privacy, as their preembryos no longer will be used for their
own procreation”).
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prevent possible incest or intermarriage, statutes attempting to
provide legislative guidance should also provide for confidential
record keeping in preembryo adoption. Gamete providers should
provide their names and any other relevant medical history to the
state for recordation. Second, proper monitoring agencies should
be established to ensure that adoptive parents are mentally,
physically, and financially fit to carry preembryos to term and
beyond. This would include updating or amending any existing
adoption laws currently in place to include and protect the
children born from adopted preembryos. In addition, the donative
parents should be relieved of all the parental and financial
responsibilities for the resulting child. Third, the legislation
should mandate the signing of disposition agreements to
determine the control of these preembryos upon divorce, death,
and other possibilities. This would also require the legislation to
provide model consent agreements with clear, unambiguous
terms for clinics and IVF participants to follow.
Another concern is the possibility that one spouse becomes
infertile and may need the preembryos to procreate. In Davis,
although the Tennessee Supreme Court was opposed to forced
procreation, it carved out an exception for those who could not
have biological children without the use of the frozen
preembryos.245 Although advance directives allow couples to plan
for future infertility, courts may still be uneasy about invalidating
such agreements knowing that the individual can only have
biological children through IVF. As a revision to Florida’s
statute, this note proposes an amendment requiring clinics to
divide sperm so that some of these gametes are frozen in their
independent state while the rest are used to create preembryos.
Because sperm can be stored safely in the frozen state while eggs
cannot,246 an infertile man would have the opportunity to have
245

Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 604 (Tenn. 1992). The Tennessee
Supreme Court held that if an agreement was available, it should be adhered
to. Id. If no agreement exists however, the courts should weigh the interests of
the parties regarding the use of the preembryos. Id. Unless the party does not
have a reasonable opportunity to become a parent without using the
preembryos, generally, the party wishing to avoid procreation will prevail. Id.
246
See Guzman, supra note 27, at 219.
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biological children without using the frozen preembryos and
without infringing on the woman’s right to avoid procreation.
Although this is only effective if the man is rendered infertile,
this simple procedure would at the very least ensure that
disposition agreements would be upheld in these particular
situations. If the man has agreed to destroy the preembryos upon
divorce and later becomes infertile, the contract could still be
honored since the man can always access his frozen sperm to
procreate with a willing participant.
States should also require informed consent and counseling
for all potential IVF participants. This would ensure that the
participants know both the benefits and risks of ARTs so that
they are able to make appropriate treatment decisions.
Counseling would educate individuals about the serious
implications of these procedures, such as the psychological stress
of infertility treatment,247 its success rates,248 any religious or
ethical concerns,249 the possibility of multiple pregnancies,250 and
the possible need for selective reduction.251 Informed consent and
counseling ensure that participants are educated about the
psychological commitments and ramifications of the treatment
they are considering. Both encourage thought and reflection by
the couple and may potentially indicate to the individuals whether
they are good candidates, emotionally and psychologically, for
ARTs. On a similar note, a brief waiting period prior to IVF
247

Lori B. Andrews & Lisa Douglass, Symposium on Biomedical
Technology and Health Care: Social and Conceptual Transformations, 65 S.
CAL. L. REV. 623, 630 (1991) (stating that some clinicians have even
recommended that couples undergo psychological counseling as part of
infertility treatment).
248
Id.
249
Ephross, supra note 180, at 450 (noting that counseling helps couples
to cope with the stress that may arise from their ethical and cultural
backgrounds).
250
Mary V. Rorty & Joann V. Pinkerton, Elective Fetal Reduction: The
Ultimate Elective Surgery, 13 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 53, 64
(1996) (noting that with infertility treatments, there is a great chance that
multiple pregnancies may occur, forcing couples to contemplate the possibility
of selective reduction).
251
Id.
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should also be encouraged by the states so that the parties can
ponder and reflect on their agreement and still have the
opportunity to modify or reconsider aspects of their contract
before IVF.252 As one author notes, “it is the function of adequate
counseling and some common sense, to assist people to make the
best decisions possible, even under what some may view as less
than ideal circumstances.”253
CONCLUSION
Although courts and scholars have been unable to agree on
the future of frozen preembryos, there is uniform consensus that
legislation needs to be enacted to alleviate the current state of
confusion. While the federal government has failed to keep up
with the growing advances in reproductive technologies, states
have acted to provide direction. With little caselaw and guidance
from the legislatures, however, these statutes do little to address
the underlying concerns and issues brought forth by frozen
preembryos.254 Disposition agreements should be recognized
because they encourage thoughtful decision-making and preserve
the intent of the IVF participants.255 Moreover, a model consent
agreement should be provided to the participants.
Although courts are free to invalidate an agreement if it
252

The success of waiting periods in other controversial areas has been
well documented. For example, state imposed waiting periods have resulted in
a greater number of gun permit rejections, since local authorities have more
time to conduct thorough background checks on applicants. William
Recktenwald & Jan Crawford, Brady Bill Not As Tough As 25-Year-Old
Illinois Gun Law, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 23, 1993, at A1, A8. A waiting period of
two-years before marriage has been recommended for covenant marriages. A
study found that out of 700 Louisiana couples who were married in 1999, half
of them in covenant marriages, only 25% of those who had waiting periods
divorced. Marilyn Serafini, Get Hitched, Stay Hitched, NAT’L J., Mar. 9,
2002, available at 2002 WL 7094794.
253
Apel, supra note 231, at 32.
254
Hopefully, with more states enacting statutes to deal with this issue,
the varying laws will compel the federal government to finally address this
matter and provide some clarity.
255
Robertson, supra note 59, at 414.
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violates public policy, a model agreement will prevent
unenforceability because of ambiguous terms. If invalidation of
an agreement should occur, it is more beneficial that the
agreement be held unenforceable because it violates a specific
public policy concern as opposed to being held invalid for
ambiguity. Violation of public policy informs participants that
such agreements would not be upheld. If a court decides that the
terms of the agreement are ambiguous, however, it is unclear as
to what would make an agreement valid or unambiguous and
whether the courts would accept such agreements. Presenting a
model consent agreement would reduce the burden on the courts
to determine the legality of the contract terms. Courts could just
look to the agreement and determine its implication on public
policy.
Mandatory implantation, moreover, should be avoided
because it is constitutionally questionable and invokes a slew of
problems and concerns. Other states should recognize the
superiority of Florida’s statute and adopt a similar framework
with some revisions for the regulation of ART and IVF
procedures. The advances made in ARTs and IVF cannot be
expected to keep pace with the federal government’s sluggishness
in enacting regulations to provide guidance in this area. Hence, it
is time for the state legislature to provide the public and the
courts with clear direction as to the future of this scientific field.
Only with responsible action by legislatures can this ambiguous
array of caselaw and statutes ever be amended and rectified.

